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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP UTAH 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, a 
Utah banking corporation, 
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, 
vs. 
MERRILL BEAN CHEVROLET, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
C i v i l No. 870007 
Catagory 15b 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OP THE 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP WEBER COUNTY 
THE HONORABLE DAVID E. ROTH, JUDGE 
David E. Bean 
BEAN & SMEDLEY 
190 South Port Lane 
Sui te 2 
Layton, UT. 84041 
Telephone: (801) 544-4221 
Attorney for Appellant 
Je f frey Weston Shie lds 
Ass i s tan t General Counsel 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK 
50 South Main, Suite 2011 
Sa l t Lake City , UT. 84144 
Telephone: (801) 535-1054 
Attorney for Respondent 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, a 
Utah b a n k i n g c o r p o r a t i o n , 
P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t , 
vs. 
MERRILL BEAN CHEVROLET, 
a De laware c o r p o r a t i o n , 
De fendan t and A p p e l l a n t . 
C i v i l No. 870007 
C a t a g o r y 15b 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
THE HONORABLE DAVID E. ROTH, JUDGE 
David E. Bean 
BEAN & SMEDLEY 
190 South F o r t Lane 
S u i t e 2 
L a y t o n , UT. 84041 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 544-42 21 
J e f f r e y Weston S h i e l d s 
A s s i s t a n t G e n e r a l Counsel 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK 
50 South Main, S u i t e 2011 
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT. 84144 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 535-1054 
A t t o r n e y for A p p e l l a n t A t t o r n e y for Responden t 
Comes now respondent Commercial Security Bank and herewith 
p e t i t i o n s the Court for rehearing of the above captioned matter as 
more par t i cu lar ly s e t forth below, 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1 . The par t i e s to t h i s c i v i l appeal, by and through counsel f 
pet i t i oned and s t i p u l a t e d to the Court to have t h i s matter heard 
pursuant to Rule 3 1 , Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, The Court 
granted that p e t i t i o n and the same was ora l ly argued before the 
Court on June 15 , 1987. 
2 . The Court rendered i t s dec i s ion over date of June 15 r 
1987 and s ta ted by minute entry that "the judgment i s reversed as a 
matter of law. Associate Chief J u s t i c e Stewart and J u s t i c e Howe 
d i s s e n t . " A true copy of the minute entry of dec i s ion i s appended 
hereto as Exhibit "A" and by t h i s reference incorporated as a part 
hereof. 
3 . This appeal was taken by respondent Merril l Bean 
Chevrolet from a summary judgment granted by the D i s t r i c t Court of 
Weber County. 
ARGUMENT 
This P e t i t i o n for Rehearing i s in the nature of a request for 
c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the Court's rul ing rather than a d irect assignment 
of error to the l e g a l or factual bas i s of the Court's dec i s ion . 
This pet i t ion i s necessitated by the fact that counsel for 
the respective parties have applied widely divergent interpretations 
of the Court's decision as the same affects the future course of the 
case and petit ioner further asserts that the Dist ict Court, upon 
remitturr wi l l not have suff icient direction to enter appropriate 
orders or take appropriate further action in the case. 
In a l e t t er dated June 23, 1987 to respondent/petitioner's 
counsel, appellant's counsel, David E. Beanf has taken the position 
that the reversal as Ma matter of law" has resulted in the Supreme 
Court entering a decision of no cause of action against the 
p e t i t i o n e e Commercial Security Bank. It would necessarily follow 
that under th i s interpretation the appellant would have the District 
Court enter an order of dismissal, no cause of action. Given that 
th i s case i s an appeal from a summary judgment, the arguments set 
forth in the briefs f and the arguments made at oral argument. 
Commercial Security Bankf believes that the decision of the Court 
means that the Court found a genuine issue of material fact and has 
therefore directed that the summary judgment be vacated and that the 
case be tried on i t s merits. 
Without further c lar i f icat ion as to the basis of the Court's 
ruling, the parties are l e f t in a quandry as to the status of their 
rights and l i a b i l i t i e s in the case. Further, the District Court 
w i l l need to know whether to enter an order of dismissal with 
prejudice or to ins t i tu te further proceedings in the matter and wi l l 
be unable to make that determination without such further 
c lar i f i cat ion . 
Respondent Commercial Security Bank a s s e r t s that i t s 
in terpre ta t ion of the rul ing i s or should be correct as the case was 
not in a posture wherein the Supreme Court could or would s u b s t i t u t e 
a f inding of no cause of act ion against the Commercial Security Bank 
in place of the summary judgment awarded to Commercial Security Bank 
by the t r i a l court which was appealed from by the appellant Merril l 
Bean Chevrolet. 
The appeal as br iefed and argued by appellant Merrill Bean 
Chevrolet attacked the method by which the t r i a l court awarded 
judgment to Commercial Security Bank; that i s f by summary judgment. 
Merrill Bean Chevrolet further emphasized on appeal that genuine 
i s s u e s of material fact e x i s t e d par t i cu lar ly as to course of deal ing 
between the p a r t i e s which i t a s s e r t s would have modified the 
or ig ina l agreements (and in part icular reference to a l e t t e r from 
the Bank to Merril l Bean Chevrolet dated January, 1980) . Merrill 
Bean further argued against the D i s t r i c t Court's f inding that the 
transact ion documents were integrated documents by assert ing that 
the Court f a i l e d to consider other relevant documentation such as 
the subsequent correspondence between the par t i e s during the years 
of 1975 and 1980. The arguments as couched by the appellant Merril l 
Bean Chevrolet ind ica te that i t was not a t any time arguing that the 
Supreme Court should s u b s t i t u t e a judgment of no cause of act ion in 
place of the summary judgment in favor of Commercial Security Bank 
but sought only to have the summary judgment vacated with d i rec t ions 
to the D i s t r i c t Court to consider the en t i re breadth of the 
transact ion , such as course of deal ing , further correspondence, 
subsequent conversat ions , and other such evidence. 
Wherefore, respondent Commercial Security Bank prays that the 
Court grant this Petition for Rehearing as the same is essential in 
order to define the rights and liabilities of the parties and to 
appropriately direct the District Court as to what further action it 
needs to take in view of this appeal. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of June, 1987. 
^tfeffrr^Weston Shields 
Attorney/for Respondent 
•CERTIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) s s . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Jeffrey Weston Shie lds r being f i r s t duly sworn upon h i s oath f 
c e r t i f i e s that he i s the attorney of record for respondent 
Commercial Security Bank in the above captioned matter; tha t he has 
read the foregoing P e t i t i o n for Re-Hearing and knows the same to be 
true and correct t o the best of h i s knowledgef information and 
b e l i e f ; and that t h i s P e t i t i o n i s presented in good f a i t h and not 
for purposes of delay. 
Je f fxey Weston Shields 
1987. 
Subscribed and sworn before me t h i s day of /^ >OL. 
fotary^Ppbli 
R e s i d i W a t : 
My Commission Expires: 
SxULJLT 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby c e r t i f y that on the O- C? day of r-W^e_-
1987, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing P e t i t i o n for 
Rehearing to the fo l lowing: 
David E. Bean 
BEAN & SMEDLEY 
190 South Fort Lane, Suite 2 
Layton, UT. 84041 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
June 15, 1987 
Jeffrey Weston Shields 
Attorney at Laui 
50 South Main Street, Suite 2011 
Salt Lake City, UT 84130-0815 
Commercial Security Bank, a 
Utah banking corporation, 
Plaintiff and and Respondent, 
Oral Argument Under 
Rule 31, R.U.S.C., 1987 
No. 870007 
Merrill Bean Chevrolet, a 
Delaware corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
The judgment is reversed as a matter of laui. Associate Chief 
Justice Stewart and Justice Houie dissent. 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
EXHIBIT A 
